Virtue and Continence
It struck me the other day that the distinction between ‘intrinsic motivation’ and ‘motivation to learn’ is very similar to the distinction between Aristotle’s ideas of ‘virtue’ and ‘continence.’
Wentzel and Brophy (2014) say that intrinsically motivated actions are those that are “performed out of interest and require no external prods, promises, or threats. They are experienced as whole self-determined, emanating from our sense of self.” Rather than intrinsic motivation, these authors encourage teachers to develop “motivation to learn” in students. They distinguish the two as follows: “Intrinsic motivation refers primarily to the affective experience of enjoying the processes involved in engaging in an activity. In contrast, motivation to learn is primarily a cognitive experience” which includes making sense of information and skills and integrating them into one’s person. A student with motivation to learn is able to find learning experiences “meaningful and worthwhile, and to try to get the intended benefits from them.” Motivation to learn is a “felt obligation.”
I think this focus on motivation to learn has advantages. It has helped me to realize that making activities ‘fun’ is not the key to good teaching; instead, it is essential to help students to see why learning matters, in itself and for life. Moreover, trying to sustain a strong emotional connection to a subject in all students is probably not attainable. I know that external motivations are helpful for me to work consistently and well on learning things, even when I truly value what I am learning.
Nevertheless, I think that the distinction misses something, by not being attentive enough to Aristotle’s wisdom in making a similar distinction.
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle describes the one who has virtue as performing good actions with delight – the virtuous person abstains from bodily pleasures or stands firm against terrible danger with joy and pleasure (1104b5). In contrast, the continent person, knowing the true good but having appetites that move away from it, refuses to obey his passions to the extent that they pull him away from what is truly good (1145b12 and surrounding). Both are good persons, but the virtuous one is better, since everything in him desires what is good. His passions have been ordered towards what is truly good, and he can delight in seeking it, rather than having to fight against his passions.
In this way, one who attains the virtue of studiousness wants to study. He no longer needs to fight against his desire to go and play video games when he ought to be studying, but instead his very desire is for study, when it is time to engage in that activity. Similarly, someone who has really gained the habit of running wants to run and does not feel happy unless they go and do it. They have the virtue of… ‘exercise’, I imagine. The continent person, though, recognizes that running is an important thing, and forces themselves away from couch and popcorn to hit the road. They cannot act out of intrinsic motivation, but rather out of a ‘felt obligation’ to do what needs to be done.
In this way, I would suggest a correction to Wentzel and Brophy’s approach. They are right to suggest that we cannot immediately bring students to have the virtue of studiousness, and thus take delight (intrinsic motivation) in the act of studying itself. Instead, they need to be led first to value study as something beneficial. However, their teachers should let them know that learning is, in fact, delightful, and that what seems a necessary chore now can become a joy. They will teach this far more effectively if they manifest that joy in their own learning – if they themselves have the virtue. Motivation to learn is a beginning: the state of continence. But it is merely the pathway to intrinsic motivation in learning, which is truly attainable by our students.
References:
Aristotle. The Basic Works of Aristotle. Trans. R. McKeon. New York: Random House, 1941.
Wentzel, K., and J. Brophy. Motivating Students to Learn. New York: Routledge, 2014.